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Abstract. Identity-based cryptography has become extremely fashion-
able in the last few years. As a consequence many proposals for identity-
based key establishment have emerged, the majority in the two party
case. We survey the currently proposed protocols of this type, examining
their security and efficiency. Problems with some published protocols are
noted.
1 Introduction
One of the main purposes of using public-key cryptography, in comparison to
shared-key cryptography, is to make key distribution easier. Public keys by their
nature need not be kept confidential. On the other hand, integrity of public keys
is critical for security and therefore public key certificates have been used for
many years. Management of public key certificates has proven to be a harder
task than was initially realised and so new directions have been sought. Identity-
based cryptography removes the need for certificates since the identity of the
owner is the public key. Such public keys can include any descriptive information
including temporal information.
Public key cryptography (and identity-based cryptography in particular) only
addresses management of long-term public keys which are not suitable for bulk
cryptographic processing. For such purposes symmetric keys are usually required
which are established freshly for each individual session. Protocols for establish-
ing such session keys come in many different types and have a reputation for
being difficult to design correctly. One of the simplest and most common types
of key establishment protocols are key agreement protocols in which the session
key is defined by inputs from the protocol participants.
In the past few years there has been extreme interest in the use of identity-
based cryptography, mainly due to the use of elliptic curve pairings to realise
cryptographic structures that did not seem possible before. Amongst the many
resulting new tools that have been proposed have been a large number of key
agreement protocols based on pairings. In the rush to exploit the new ideas
many of these protocols have been published without a careful security analysis
or a systematic comparison with alternatives. The situation is somewhat like
that 20 years ago when key establishment protocols for conventional public key
cryptography were routinely published without a proper security analysis.
The purpose of this paper is to make a critical appraisal of the current status
of identity-based key agreement protocols, limited to the two-party case. We
examine the security properties and efficiency achieved in a large number of
published protocols. We emphasise the importance of precise security models
and note deficiencies in several protocols.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The following section de-
fines the subject matter in more detail by discussing relevant background on
identity-based cryptography and key agreement protocols. Section 3 surveys the
field of existing published protocols and analyses their comparitive security and
efficiency. The conclusion speculates where subsequent progress may be likely.
2 Identity-based cryptography and key agreement
The original idea for identity-based cryptography goes back to Shamir [30] over
20 years ago. Identity-based cryptography does away with public keys altogether
so no certificates are required (although the authenticity of public parameters
needs to be assured). This is of great benefit in simplifying key management.
However, a drawback of all true identity-based schemes is that users cannot be
allowed to generate their own private keys (otherwise anyone could find any
user’s private key) and therefore key escrow is inevitable.
Shamir gave an algorithm for identity-based signatures but was unable to ob-
tain an identity-based encryption algorithm. However, in 1987 Okamoto [24,25]
published the first identity-based key agreement protocol. It uses a composite
modulus n whose factorisation is known only to a trusted authority. The author-
ity chooses values e and d as in the RSA algorithm, so that ed mod φ(n) = 1,
and an element g that is primitive in both the integers mod p and the integers
mod q. The values g and e are made public.
Before engaging in the key agreement protocol each user must register with
the authority to obtain a private key. Party Pi’s identification string, IDi,
is treated as an integer modulo n. The authority calculates the value si =
ID−di mod n and distributes si securely to user I . Once this registration is com-
pleted users may agree fresh session keys without recourse to any other infor-
mation other than the fixed parameters e and n and the identity of the partner
with which the key is to be shared.
Protocol 1 shows the key agreement message flows. The shared secret is
defined as ZAB = g
erArB . On the assumption that it is necessary to know either
sA or sB in order to find ZAB , the scheme prevents an adversary from learning
the session key.
Mambo and Shizuya [22] and later Kim et al. [18] provided a security proof
against active attacks. They showed a reduction of attacks on the protocol to
the Diffie–Hellman problem or to the RSA problem. Their model is similar to
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Protocol 1: Okamoto’s identity-based protocol
Interest in identity-based cryptography was resurrected when Boneh and
Franklin [6] presented the first identity-based encryption scheme using the idea
of a bilinear map based on elliptic curve pairings. However, even before this
the applications of pairings to identity-based key agreement were recognised by
Sakai et al. [29]. Before looking at the SOK protocol we have to introduce some
notation and concepts about pairings and bilinear maps. Except where noted
otherwise, the following notation is used for all protocols in this paper.
Using the notation of Boneh and Franklin [6], we let G1 be an additive group
of prime order q and G2 be a multiplicative group of the same order q. We
assume the existence of a map eˆ from G1 × G1 to G2. Typically, G1 will be a
subgroup of the group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field, G2 will
be a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a related finite field and the map
eˆ will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on the elliptic curve. The
mapping eˆ must be efficiently computable and has the following properties.
Bilinear: for Q,W,Z ∈ G1, both
eˆ(Q,W + Z) = eˆ(Q,W ) · eˆ(Q,Z) and eˆ(Q+W,Z) = eˆ(Q,Z) · eˆ(W,Z).
Non-degenerate: for some element P ∈ G1, we have eˆ(P, P ) 6= 1G2 .
When a ∈ Zq and Q ∈ G1, we write aQ for scalar multiplication of Q by a. Due
to bilinearity, for any Q,W ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Zq we have:
eˆ(aQ, bW ) = eˆ(Q,W )ab = eˆ(abQ,W ).
Recent literature [1, 2, 6, 15] provides a more comprehensive description of how
these groups, pairings and other parameters should be selected in practice for
efficiency and security.
A random value s ∈ Zq plays the role of the master secret of the Key
Generation Centre (KGC) in the ID-based system. The KGC distributes to
each party Pi with identity IDi a long-term key pair consisting of public key
Qi = H1(IDi) and private key Si = sQi. Here H1 is a hash function mapping
identities IDi ∈ {0, 1}
∗ onto G1. The KGC also publishes the system param-
eters which include descriptions of the two groups G1 and G2, a point P that
generates G1, and a master public key sP .
SOK Protocol [29]. With the above parameters, any two principals Pi, Pj with
identities IDi, IDj can efficiently calculate a shared key:
Fij = eˆ(Qi, Qj)
s = eˆ(Si, Qj) = eˆ(Sj , Qi).
This protocol for identity-based, non-interactive key distribution is analogous to
static Diffie–Hellman but does not require certificates. Dupont and Enge [14]
analysed the security of the protocol. Like many identity-based protocols, the
security of SOK relies on the difficulty of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem
(BDHP). Given G1, G2 and eˆ as above, the BDHP is to compute eˆ(P, P )
xyz ∈ G2
given 〈P, xP, yP, zP 〉 with P ∈ G1 and x, y, z ∈ Zq .
At this point it is reasonable to ask what advantage there is in identity-
based key agreement based on pairings in comparison with older identity-based
protocols such as Okamoto’s (Protocol 1 above). Generally the answer may be
expected to be the same advantages as using elliptic curves over older public key
technology, namely a saving in computation and key size. This is certainly true
with regard to savings in bandwidth since message exchanges can be considerably
shorter. However, it may not necessarily be the case in terms of computation
because the pairing operation can be quite costly. Research is still quite active
in deciding how to implement pairings most efficiently. In Section 3.2 we compare
the efficiency of many pairings-based key agreement protocols. Another reason
for choosing pairings-based key agreement is to exploit the infrastructure for
identity-based cryptography with its many other benefits. In the remainder of
this paper we look only at pairings-based key agreement.
2.1 Security Properties for Key Agreement
There are many properties that are required for security of any key agreement
protocol. These have been discussed by many authors and we refer to the paper of
Blake-Wilson and Menezes [5] for an excellent overview. The most basic property
is that a passive adversary eavesdropping on the protocol should be unable to
obtain the session key. In a modern context we usually require that, far from
obtaining the whole key, the adversary cannot even reliably distinguish between
the session key and a randomly chosen string of the expected length. We also
generally expect the adversary to be an active one, not only able to see all
messages sent, but also able to alter, delete and fabricate messages – in short
the adversary is in control of the communications on the network. A number of
typical attacks lead to additional security properties as follows.
Known key security. It is often reasonable to assume that the adversary will
be able to obtain session keys from any session different from the one under
attack. A protocol has known-key security if it is secure under this assump-
tion. This is generally regarded as a standard requirement for key establish-
ment protocols.
Unknown key-share security. Sometimes the adversary may be unable to
obtain any useful information about a session key, but can deceive the pro-
tocol principals about the identity of the peer entity. This can result in
principals giving away information to the wrong party or accepting data
as coming from the wrong party. Consequently security against unknown
key-share attacks is regarded as a standard requirement.
Forward secrecy. When the long-term key of an entity is compromised the
adversary will be able to masquerade as that entity in any future protocol
runs. However, the situation will be even worse if the adversary can also use
the compromised long-term key to obtain session keys that were accepted be-
fore the compromise. Protocols that prevent this are said to provide forward
secrecy. Since there is usually a computational cost in providing forward
secrecy it is sometimes sacrificed in the interest of efficiency.
Forward secrecy for identity-based protocols is similar to conventional public
key cryptography. However, there is an additional concern since the master
key of the KGC is another secret that could become compromised. When this
happens it is clear that the long-term keys of all users will be compromised,
but it is possible that a protocol can provide forward secrecy in the usual
sense but still give away old session keys if the master key becomes known.
We will say that a protocol that retains confidentiality of session keys even
when the master key is known provides KGC forward secrecy.
Key Compromise Impersonation Resistance. Another problem that may
occur when the long-term key of an entity A is compromised is that the
adversary may be able to masquerade not only as A but also to A as another
party B. Such a protocol is said to allow key compromise impersonation.
Resistance to such attacks is often seen as desirable. Another property that
is sometimes desired is deniability, which ensures that the protocol does not
permit a proof that any particular principal took part. Resistance to key
compromise impersonation seems to conflict with deniability [7].
Although the informal security properties just discussed are useful concepts in
assessing protocols, the modern view is that a formal analysis is a more reliable
way to obtain confidence in the security of a protocol. The computational ap-
proach to proofs of protocols for key establishment was established by Bellare
and Rogaway [3,4]. Several variants and extensions of the model have been used.
Here we outline the basic method. The adversaryA is a probabilistic polynomial
time algorithm that controls all the communications that take place between all
protocol principals. It does this by interacting with a set of oracles, each of which
represents an instance of a principal in a specific protocol run. Each principal
has an identifier U and oracle ΠsU represents the actions of principal U in the
protocol run indexed by integer s. Interactions with the adversary are called
oracle queries. We now describe each one informally.
Send(U, s,m) This query allows the adversary to make the principal U run the
protocol normally. The oracle ΠsU will return to the adversary the same next
message that an honest principal U would if sent message m according to
the conversation so far.
Reveal(U, s) This query models known key security. If a session key Ks has
previously been accepted by ΠsU then it is returned to the adversary. An
oracle is called opened if it has been the object of a Reveal query.
Corrupt(U,K) This query models insider attacks and unknown key share attacks
by the adversary. The query returns the oracle’s internal state and sets the
long-term key of U to be the value K chosen by the adversary. The adversary
can then control the behaviour of U with Send queries. A principal is called
corrupted if it has been the object of a Corrupt query.
Test(U, s) Once the oracle ΠsU has accepted a session key Ks the adversary
can attempt to distinguish it from a random key as the basis of determining
security of the protocol. A random bit b is chosen; if b = 0 thenKs is returned
while if b = 1 a random string is returned from the same distribution as
session keys. This query is only asked once by the adversary.
The security of the protocol is defined by a game played between the adversary
and a collection of user oracles. The adversary will interact with the oracles
through the queries defined above. At some stage during the execution a Test
query is performed by the adversary. The target oracle for the test query (and
any partner it has) must not have been the subject of a Reveal or Corrupt query.
Eventually the adversary outputs its guess (a bit) indicating whether the input
to the Test query was the real key or not. Success of the adversaryA is measured
in terms of its success in getting this guess correct.
Definition 1. A protocol P is a secure key establishment protocol if:
– in the presence of a benign adversary partner oracles accept the same key.
– no probabilistic polynomial time adversary can win the above game with prob-
ability significantly more than 1
2
.
Security of a protocol is typically proved by finding a reduction to some well
known computational problem whose intractability is assumed. The formal def-
inition of security in the computational models captures most of the attacks
mentioned above. Some model variants do not consider forward secrecy, while
resistance to key compromise impersonation is usually not modelled.
2.2 An example
In this section we look at a specific protocol due to Ryu, Yoon and Yoo [27]. This
should help to understand the typical structure of identity-based key agreement
and illustrate some of the important properties. Figure 2 describes the protocol.
Parties A and B choose random values a and b and exchange ephemeral public
keys TA and TB which are used to form the ephemeral Diffie–Hellman key abP in
group G1. They are also assumed to know each other’s identity and can therefore
both form the long-term shared key eˆ(QA, QB)
s exactly as in the SOK protocol.
At the end of the protocol execution, both A and B will compute session keys
of the same value:
KAB = H(A,B,KA, VA) = H(A,B, a · TB, eˆ(SA, QB))
= H(A,B, abP, eˆ(QA, QB)
s)





TA = aP−−−−−−−→ b ∈R Z
∗
q
KA = a · TB
TB = bP←−−−−−−− KB = b · TA
VA = eˆ(SA, QB) VB = eˆ(SB , QA)
Protocol 2: Ryu–Yoon–Yoo ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol
= H(A,B, abP, eˆ(QA, QB)
s)
= KBA
A Key Replicating Attack We now describe a new attack in which the adver-
sary succeeds in forcing the establishment of a session, S, (other than the Test
session or its matching session) that has the same key as the Test session. In
this case the adversary can distinguish whether the Test-session key is real or
random by asking a Reveal query to the oracle associated with S. Such an at-
tack has been dubbed a key replicating attack by Krawczyk [19]. The attack
succeeds if the adversary is allowed to ask a Reveal query, as shown in Fig-









e · TA−−−−−−−→ b ∈R Z
∗
q
KA′ = a · e · TB
e · TB←−−−−−−− Intercept
TB = bP←−−−−−−− KB′ = b · e · TA
VA = eˆ(SA, QB) VB = eˆ(SB , QA)
KAB = H(A,B, abeP, eˆ(QA, QB)
s) = KBA
Fig. 1. Execution of Protocol 2 in the presence of a malicious adversary
tocol execution, but have accepted the same session key. This session key is
KAB = H(A,B, abeP, eˆ(QA, QB)
s) = KBA, depends on e, an input from A.
This is a violation of the “key integrity” property [16] which states that any
accepted session key should depend only on inputs from the protocol principals.
Since both A and B do not have any matching conversations (they are not part-
ners since their protocol views are different), A is able to trivially expose a fresh
session key by revealing either A or B.
Key Compromise Impersonation In order to demonstrate that the Ryu–Yoon–
Yoo protocol does not achieve key compromise impersonation resilience (as
claimed), we assume that the adversary, A, has corrupted player A (using a
Corrupt query) and has knowledge of the long-term secret key of A, sQA.
A impersonates B and starts a new protocol execution with A. At the end of
this protocol execution, A is able to compute the session key of A as per protocol
specification, as shown below:
KAB = H(A,B,KE , VA) = H(A,B, e · TA, eˆ(SA, QB))
= H(A,B, aeP, eˆ(QA, QB)
s)
= H(A,B, a · TE, eˆ(QA, QB)
s)
3 Comparing identity-based key agreement protocols
In this section we survey a large number of protocols that have been published in
the recent literature and assess their security and efficiency. Most of the proto-
cols are defined using two message flows, one in each direction between principals
A and B. There have been some one-way protocols proposed [26] but we will
not look at these in this survey. Many protocols are also defined in a three mes-
sage version, typically by adding a “handshake” between the parties to provide
confidence that they both hold the same key.
We note that there are many similarities between identity-based key agree-
ment and key agreement using standard public key cryptography. Arguably the
aim in designing a good ID-based key agreement protocols is to achieve all the
properties of the best conventional key agreement protocols but without the need
for certified public key, and at the same time trying to maximise efficiency.
3.1 Protocol Definitions
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the definition of each of the protocols. Those in Ta-
ble 1 use unauthenticated messages, which means that private keys are not used
in their construction. In contrast protocols in Table 2 include some direct au-
thentication information, which is checked by the recipient before proceeding.
There are three ingredients which essentially define most of these protocols.
Private key Most protocols use the private key construction used in the first
protocol of Sakai et al. which we denote Type I. There are to date a few
examples of protocols using an alternative key first suggested by Sakai and
Kasahara [28] which we denote Type II.
– Type I: SU = sQI
– Type II: SU = (s+ qU )
−1P
Note that Type I private keys are members of the elliptic curve group G1
defined by mapping the identity string IDI of entity I to the value QI
using a suitable hash function. Boneh and Franklin [6] suggest an explicit
function for a particular elliptic curve which costs one exponentiation in the
underlying field. This mapping must also be applied to find the public key
QI . In contrast Type II private keys use a value qU which is a hash of IDU
whose output is a scalar in Zq . The corresponding public key for the Type II
private key is (s+ qU )P which can be calculated as sP + qUP . Finally there
is a variant of Type II which we denote II’. Type II’ keys are defined using
a different pairing and use two different public generators P and Q for the
inputs of the pairing.
Message structure In order to obtain the best efficiency most protocols send
only one message block typically consisting of one elliptic curve point. Some
protocols add a second value which can typically be considered as a signature
value which is checked by the recipient before the session key is computed.
Session key construction There are many different ways that the exchanged
messages can be combined in order to derive the session key. Each party
uses the received message together with its private long-term key and its
short-term random input.
Protocol Private key Message Session key
Smart [32] Type I TA = aP eˆ(SA, TB) · eˆ(SB , TA)
CK [9] #1’ Type I TA H(eˆ(SA, TB) · eˆ(SB, TA) ‖ abP )
RYY [27] Type I TA H(A ‖ B ‖ eˆ(QA, QB)
s ‖ abP )
Shim [31] Type I TA H(A ‖ B ‖ eˆ(P, P )
abs · eˆ(QA, P )
bs ·
eˆ(P,QB)
as · eˆ(QA, QB)
s)
CK [9] #2 Type I WA = aQA eˆ(QA, QB)
s(a+b)
CK [9] # 2’ Type I TA,WA H(eˆ(QA, QB)
s(a+b) ‖ abP )
Yi [36] Type I WA eˆ((a+ (WA)x)QA, (b+ (WB)x)QB)
s
CJL [12] #2 Type I TA H(eˆ(P, P )
abs ‖ QA ‖ QB)
Wang [34] Type I WA eˆ((ψB + b)QB, ψA + a)QA)
sh
MB [23] #1 Type II RA = aQB eˆ(P, P )
ab
MB [23] #2 Type II’ RA eˆ(P,Q)
ab
Xie [35] #1 Type II RA eˆ(P, P )
ab+b+a
Xie [35] #2 Type II’ RA eˆ(P,Q)
ab+b+a
Table 1. Summary of unauthenticated two-message ID-based protocols
Protocols in Table 1 are simple enough that it is possible to reconstruct each one
from the summary information. In each protocol the message shown is that sent
by A. The corresponding message sent by B is symmetrical. In each protocol A
computes a random ephemeral private key a which is a scalar in Zq . In protocols
which use a Type I key exchange, messages are either of the form TA = aP , or
of the form WA = aQA, or both. Protocols with keys of Type II or II’ exchange
messages of the form RA = aQB where B is the other party. The session key is
shown in the table in symmetrical format which does not show directly how it
is constructed. H denotes some secure hash function; ‖ denote concatenation of
two messages. In Wang’s protocol ψA = pi(WA,WB), where pi : G1×G1 → Z
∗
q is
a special hash function, and h is the co-factor of the elliptic curve defining G1.
In Yi’s protocol, (WA)x denotes the x-coordinate of point WA.
Protocol Private key Messages Session key
KRY [17] Type I TA,H(TA)SA + a · sP eˆ(P, P )
abs
CJL [12] #1 Type I asP, aSA H(absP ‖ QA ‖ QB)
BMP [7] Type I aP (authenticated) H(abP )
CHLS [11] Type II See text H(ga, b, . . .)
Table 2. Summary of authenticated two-party, two-message ID-based protocols
Protocols in Table 2 include direct authentication information as a signature of
some sort. The first two protocols in this table are symmetrical and use messages
as shown. The BMP protocol [7] is the only protocol shown that exists only in
a 3-move version. This protocol provides direct authentication of the ephemeral
keys aP and bP . The CHLS protocol [11] is specially designed for use by a client
of low computational power and consequently its structure is very different from
the other protocols listed. Essentially the client sends an encrypted and signed
secret value ga which can be recovered and authenticated by the server. The
server sends its input b in cleartext and both parties can then compute the
session key as a hash of ga, b and other values.
There are some interesting comparisons possible between the protocols seen
in Table 1 and various protocols using conventional Diffie–Hellman in finite fields.
For example, the RYY protocol has strong similarities to the so called Unified
Model protocol which is included in the IEEE P1363 standard. There is a close
similarity also between the Yi protocol and the MQV protocol. Finally the CK
protocol is closely related to MTI A(0) protocol. (Blake-Wilson and Menezes [5]
include descriptions of each of these protocols.) These similarities may extend
to the security properties of these protocols, though this is currently unproven.
Some protocols include versions that can work with different domains in
which separate KGCs use different master keys. These include the CK, MB,
and Xie protocols. A protocol of Lee et al. [20] (not included in the table) is
essentially the same as the CK protocol extended to domains in which different
groups are used.
3.2 Protocol efficiency
Table 3 summarises the computation of each party. We only record multiplica-
tions and pairings in group G1, and exponentiations from G2. For simplicity we
equate exponentiations in G2 with multiplications in G1 and add them to the
total for M , while the pairings are denoted P .
Computational requirements are divided into two parts, online and offline.
The offline computations are those that can be computed before the protocol run
starts. We have counted as offline those computations that require knowledge of
the identity of the peer. This may not always be realistic. Some computations are
also independent of the peer’s identity. For the CHLM protocol the computation
is different for the client (shown first) and the server (shown second).
Protocol Computation Computation
On-line Off-line
Smart [32] 1P 2M + 1P
CK [9] #1’ 1M + 1P 2M + 1P
CK [9] #2 1P 2M
CK [9] #2’ 1M + 1P 2M
Wang [34] 2M + 1P 1M
Yi [36] 2M 1M + 1P
RYY [27] 1M 1M + 1P
KRY [17] 2M + 3P 3M
CJL [12] #1 2M + 3P 2M
CJL [12] #2 1M + 2P 1M
Shim [31] 1P 2M
Xie [35] #1 1M + 1P 2M + 1P
Xie [35] #2 1M + 1P 2M + 1P
MB [23] #1 1M + 1P 1M
MB [23] #2 1M + 1P 1M
BMP [7] 1M 2M + 1P
CHLS [11] 0/(2P + 2M) 4M/0
Table 3. Computational requirements for two-party, two-message ID-based protocols
The amount of communication bandwidth required in each protocol can be esti-
mated by looking at the messages sent in Tables 1 and 2. Well known techniques
for elliptic curve point compression allow points to be expressed as an element
in the underlying field plus a single bit. The bandwidth used is considerably less
than the RSA-based Protocol 1 if only one point is sent. Protocols that require
online pairings computation may be rather inefficient since a pairing requires
several times the computation of an elliptic curve multiplication. However, the
exact computation required varies considerably depending on the choice of curve
and various implementation details. Research is continuing in this area [1].
Most protocol descriptions ignore the cofactor that may be required to ensure
that the point sent is a member of the prime order subgroup. Such a check may
be important for security reasons (to avoid small subgroup attacks such as those
by Lim and Lee [21]). However, when the received point is used in a pairing the
effort required to check that the point is in G1 is only a small part of the overall
computation required.
3.3 Protocol security
We now look at the security of these protocols. Table 4 notes whether each proto-
col provides forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation resistance (KCIR)
and has a security proof. Most proofs have been attempted in the Bellare–
Rogaway (1993) model [3]. However, some of the original proofs have run into
trouble and the table shows that many protocols have proofs only in a restricted
form in which the adversary is prevented from asking any Reveal queries.
The CHLS and Wang protocols have proofs in the (full) Bellare & Rogaway
(1993) model [3] while the BMP protocol has a proof in the Canetti–Krawczyk
model [8]. The CK and BMP protocols are proven secure based on the Bilin-
ear Diffie–Hellman (BDH) assumption while the Wang protocol is proven secure
using a stronger decisional version of BDH (i.e., DBDH). The security of the
Xie and MB protocols assumes the intractability of the Bilinear Inverse Diffie–
Hellman (BIDH) problem, which has been proven to be polynomial time equiva-
lent to the BDH problem [37]. The CHLS protocol is based on two assumptions:
the modified BIDH with k values (k-mBIDH) and the Collusion Attack Algo-
rithm with k traitors (k-CAA), which are stronger than the BDH assumption.
Protocol Fwd. Secrecy KCIR Security proof
Smart [32] No Yes No
CK #1’ [9] Yes Yes No
CK #2 [9] No Yes Restricted (BDH)
CK #2’ [9] No Yes Restricted (BDH)
Wang [34] No Yes Yes (DBDH)
Yi [36] Yes Yes No
RYY [27] No No No (See Sec. 2.2.)
KRY [17] Yes (No KGC− FS) Yes No
CJL [12] #1 Yes Yes No (Key replicating attack)
CJL [12] #2 Yes (KGC − FS) Yes No (Key replicating attack)
Shim [31] No No Broken by Sun and Hsieh [33]
Xie [35] #1 Yes (No KGC− FS) Yes Restricted (BIDH) [10]
Xie [35] #2 Yes Yes Restricted (BIDH) [10]
MB [23] #1 Yes (No KGC− FS) No Restricted (BIDH) [10], [13]
MB [23] #2 Yes No Restricted (BIDH) [10], [13]
BMP [7] Yes No Yes (BDH)
CHLS [11] No Yes Yes (k-mBIDH & k-CAA)
Table 4. Security properties for two-party, two-message ID-based protocols
Krawczyk [19] has pointed out that there is a generic attack against forward
secrecy on any two-party two-flow protocol for which the messages are not ex-
plicitly authenticated. In this attack the adversary first masquerades as A, gen-
erates the first protocol flow, and records the reply of B. Later, the adversary
can corrupt A and compute the old key in the same way as A would have. The
existence of such an attack means that none of the protocols in Table 1 can
provide forward secrecy. We have taken a more relaxed view of this (as have
most authors) and assume that key confirmation will follow which prevents this
attack. Note, however, that in most cases there is no proof of forward secrecy.
The key replicating attacks noted for CJL protocols 1 and 2 are similar to that
on the RYY protocol described in Section 2.2. As in that case, it is possible to fix
this problem by adding a session identifier (the concatenation of the exchanged
messages) into the definition of the session key [13].
It is clear from Table 4 that there is a significant lack of ID-based proto-
cols with a full security proof. Understanding of the pitfalls and problems has
advanced recently and progress in this area can be anticipated soon.
4 Conclusion
Our survey of two-party identity-based key agreement has shown that there
are many protocols which have not received adequate scrutiny. Most published
protocols do not carry a security proof so that we cannot be sure what their
security properties are – our examples show that they may not be as secure as
we may like. We urge caution when proposing new protocols, particularly to
ensure that a formal security statement is provided with adequate proof, and
also that comparison with the many existing protocols is made. Analogies with
previously published protocols with well-proven properties may prove useful.
It is still not clear which is the best protocol for a particular application,
nor what are the limitations against further improvement. Some of the protocols
that look best from the performance and informal analysis are currently lacking
a security proof. Another trend to look out for is proofs in the standard model
– currently all the proofs that exist rely on random oracles.
In addition to two-party protocols, tripartite and multi-party identity-based
key agreement protocols are currently being widely proposed. The correct secu-
rity model in these cases is even more uncertain but we can expect useful progress
in this area in line with the recent advances in security proofs for multi-party
key agreement with conventional public key cryptogaphy.
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